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 The European Defence Agency and Permanent Structured Cooperation: Are we 
heading towards another missed opportunity? 
 
Introduction 
The Member States’ military capability deficits are well known. These can be attributed to 
nationally focused investment which leads to duplication and non-interoperability, the lack of 
a fully-fledged European strategic culture which would provide top-down guidance as to 
which capabilities need to be developed and finally Member States’ static and declining 
defence budgets. Attempts to close the EU’s numerous military deficits have been haphazard 
and have often been no more than a documenting exercise where capability gaps are identified 
but little is done to actually close them (the ECAP process being a case in point).  
 
Nonetheless, there are significant financial imperatives for moving towards a greater use of 
pooling due to the current economic crisis. This article therefore analyses the work of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) in military capability development and in particular 
focuses on the role that Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD) can play to 
encourage the Member States to move from defence sovereignty to pooled defence 
resources.
1
 Two interconnected research questions provide the core focus for the research. 1. 
What does PSCD add to what currently exists and to what extent is this likely to re-invigorate 
capability development? 2. To what extent can the EDA play a role in developing PSCD thus 
enabling the concept to succeed?  Indeed, the introduction of PSCD in the Treaty of Lisbon 
can be seen as another ‘perceived opportunity’2 for the EU Member States to finally begin to 
address their capability gaps. Nonetheless, whether significant change actually materialises 
will depend upon how such a concept is implemented in practice and the mechanisms in place 
within the EDA to formalise and encourage cooperation.  
 
 2 
A recent attempt at what is partly envisaged under PSCD can already be highlighted by the 
EU Battlegroups which have not yet been deployed despite opportunities to do so. This 
highlights a major hurdle in increasing the EU’s actorness because whilst PSCD might act as 
a mechanism to close capability gaps it is not a mechanism to overcome political willingness 
problems. Indeed it is argued that the Battlegroups provide a warning for PSCD in that only 
capabilities which are useful and most importantly usable should be developed. Finally, it 
highlights that conflicting visions of European security
3
 including when and where force is 
used has impacted upon the political willingness to use the Battlegroups – divisions which 
will form the basis of discussions on the formation of PSCD. 
 
Nonetheless, convergence is beginning to take place as highlighted in the European Security 
Strategy,
4
 which combined with the albeit limited learning from military operations which 
have occurred in addition to the long term vision already carried out within the EDA
5
 offers a 
rough roadmap for capability development. Indeed we argue that the EDA has the potential to 
be a champion of PSCD, particularly in relation to the operationalisation of the concept. To 
offer a full insight into how these conflicting visions impact on the work of the EDA and 
capability development, strategic culture will be used. A security community’s strategic 
culture provides its policy-makers with a range of beliefs, attitudes and norms concerning 
what actions are appropriate within the security and defence field which subsequently shapes 
their perceptions of defence issues. These relate to when, where and how force is used and 
provide an insight as to the extent to which differences between the Member States impact on 
the EU’s actorness in defence. Therefore strategic culture enables a top down approach to 
capability development to be created which begins with what the EU wants to do in the world 
and then which capabilities need to be created to fulfil this rather than a bottom up approach. 
This would involve Member States looking at what capabilities they possess and then 
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deciding what they can do with these as there is no strategic culture to provide guidelines 
which shape what action the EU might take. 
 
The article concludes that despite conflicting visions of European security, advances have 
been made to close capability gaps more recently, including the idea of a European Air 
Transport Fleet and a Future Transport Helicopter initiative. This highlights that pooling has 
become a more popular option in addressing Member States’ capability deficits. This 
underlines that PSCD, with the EDA acting as a pooling enabler, has the ability to be a 
success as a tool for capability development. Nonetheless, the Battlegroups provide a timely 
reminder that only tools which are needed and can be used flexibly should be developed. If 
the Member States fail to improve their military capabilities through such mechanisms as 
PSCD, this would represent a missed opportunity further denting the EU’s image as a global 
security actor.  
 
1. European Strategic Culture  
This article posits that due to the lack of a fully fledged strategic culture, agreement on when, 
where and how force is used is only in its infancy and as such has hindered EU defence 
efforts. Therefore, military capability development through the EDA has been weak as 
Member States prefer national initiatives. Additionally, without an agreement on what role the 
EU should play, it is difficult to be decisive concerning which military capabilities to acquire.  
 
Strategic culture has been utilised from both a country and EU perspective. It can be defined 
as the beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of force, held by a security community 
which has had a ‘unique historical experience’.6 Of central importance is the interpretation of 
these historical experiences which as Berger states are ‘transmitted through socialization; and 
by providing individuals with cognitive maps, they serve as filters through which subsequent 
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events and experiences are apprehended’.7 Whilst strategic culture emphasises continuity over 
change, this does not mean that the concept is static. Change can occur in response to events 
in the external security environment, although this is not automatic as a strategic culture once 
socialised is also institutionalised. As Meyer highlights ‘norms are so stable because they are 
often institutionalised in laws, policies and power structures’.8 These institutionalised beliefs 
and values can impact upon which policy options are available. As such, strategic culture acts 
as a lens through which external security issues are considered relevant or otherwise. The 
most profound changes occur in reaction to war and conflict. In this instance a country’s 
strategic culture is replaced with another. Normally, however, change only occurs 
incrementally in response to new security conditions such as 9/11.
9
 In this instance two or 
more parts of a strategic culture come into conflict with each other which leads to a 
realignment.  
 
However whilst this framework certainly fits for a sovereign country, to what extent is it 
possible for an organisation such as the EU to have a strategic culture? CSDP is governed by 
unanimity decision-making and therefore it is the Member States who make the decisions 
concerning which military missions to participate in, whether to sign up to political security 
documents such as the European Security Strategy or the Headline Goal 2010 and to what 
extent they will use the EDA for capability development. Thus the perspective taken here is to 
look at convergence and divergence between the EU Member States
10
 as opposed to looking 
at strategic culture from an EU perspective.
11
 Nonetheless, how much convergence actually 
has to take place? The EU does not need to have a strategic culture akin to an EU Member 
State which is involved in a multitude of international security organisations and have 
national security interests outside of the EU sphere. Instead an EU strategic culture should be 
seen as an additional layer which lies on top of national strategic cultures. As Meyer states ‘a 
European strategic culture is not taking the place of national strategic cultures, but it should 
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be conceived of primarily as the increasing institutionalisation of those ideas, norms and 
values that are sufficiently shared at the national level’.12 Therefore some convergence has to 
take place concerning the EU’s use of military force. 
 
Knowing what military tasks the EU should conduct, where operations should be conducted 
and which other organisations the EU should work with (e.g. the UN and NATO) is crucial 
for military capability development. As Cornish and Edwards highlight, this is ‘in order to 
rationalize the acquisition of capabilities necessary for the range of humanitarian and 
peacekeeping tasks envisaged. Equally, without military capabilities, all talk of a strategic 
culture would ring hollow’.13 Whilst convergence has taken place between the EU Member 
States concerning the security threats that the EU is facing, as highlighted in the European 
Security Strategy, there is no agreement concerning how they should be dealt with. This has 
led to ad hoc decision-making concerning potential military operations. Although the 
beginnings of a European strategic culture can be seen, it has not developed fully enough to 
act as a guide for the use of military capabilities.  
 
A lack of a fully fledged strategic culture, leads to a suboptimal CSDP. In essence, military 
missions that are too complex or too high in intensity, which could result in casualties, are 
unlikely to be agreed. In other words civilian operations are more likely to be deployed than 
military ones. Divergences regarding the use of force impact how and which military 
capabilities are to be acquired. In this respect, the creation of PSCD is intended to act as a 
motor for the development of more effective and robust military capabilities in the EU - 
something which the EDA has not been able to do so far. Thus the successful 
operationalisation of PSCD is seen as an important factor for developing the ‘Defence’ 
component of the EU and hence for contributing to a more optimal CSDP. Bátora highlights 
that ‘the EDA has been a flashpoint of institutional logics representing different visions of 
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how various aspects of defense integration in the EU should be organized’.14 These 
differences have led to the evolution of a number of divisions in the EU in this respect, which 
are directly linked to the development of an EU strategic culture in security and defence. 
These divisions can be summed up as follows: 
 
·  Atlanticism vs. Europeanist approaches – this impacts upon what capabilities should 
be developed and where these capabilities should be bought from. Does a more 
Atlanticist vision lead to a greater reluctance to work through the EDA and an 
inclination to buy American? 
· Regional vs. Global approach to security and defence – in particular this encompasses 
how willing Member States are to use force outside of Europe, which in turn is based 
on their strategic culture. Divisions concerning this field impact upon such areas as 
strategic airlift and sealift which are needed for missions outside of the region. 
· Pro-active on the use of force vs. Restrictions concerning the use of force – i.e. which 
tasks should military capabilities be created for? This relates to  the type of operations 
that the EU would be prepared to carry out i.e. should the EU aim for mostly low-
level, less demanding, ‘last resort’ instruments or high-end and more demanding 
military operations geared towards pre-emptive engagement?   
· Defence sovereignty vs. Pooled defence resources
15
 – do Member States want to buy 
nationally or go through the EDA in order to pool defence capabilities with other EU 
Member States? In other words, on the one hand there are those Member States who 
would prefer that the defence industry including research and development (R&D) in 
addition to armaments production remain nationally geared towards self-sufficiency 
and self reliance. On the other hand are those Member States who would prefer that 
defence, armaments and R&D are conducted in the framework of a common 
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endeavour - transnational projects, common standards and joint procurement 
programmes.
16
 
    
These four dimensions will be used as key factors to ascertain the extent to which an EU 
strategic culture in security and defence has developed and how far this matters for providing 
an explicit top-down approach to military capability development through the EDA and 
PSCD. Three of these dimensions reflect the key tenets of strategic culture, namely ‘when’, 
‘where’ and ‘how’ the EU uses force. ‘When’ refers to pro-active vs. restrictions on the use of 
force; ‘Where’ - to a regional vs. global approach to security and defence; and ‘How’ to 
Atlanticist vs. Europeanist approaches. Additionally, Atlanticist vs. Europeanist approaches 
and defence sovereignty vs. pooled defence resources impact whether PSCD will function at 
the practical level. If Member States prefer to buy American or do not wish to pool due to 
national preferences then PSCD will not be successful. Thus all four dimensions set the 
parameters for the successful or unsuccessful functioning of PSCD.  
 
2. Developing PSCD 
PSCD is a new tool for capability development which is part of the Lisbon Treaty and 
previously the European Constitution. It allows for groups of Member States who are military 
able and politically willing, to enhance their military capabilities including the ability to 
contribute to a Battlegroup.
17
 To meet these objectives, Article 2 of the protocol on PSCD 
specifies five areas of action. These include: agreeing on objectives for the level of 
investment in defence equipment; bringing defence apparatus into line with each other as far 
as possible, by harmonizing the identification of military needs, by pooling, and where 
appropriate specialisation; to enhance force availability, interoperability, flexibility and 
deployability by setting common objectives regarding the commitment of forces; addressing 
shortfalls identified by the Capability Development Mechanism and taking part where 
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appropriate in equipment programmes within the EDA.
18
 The decision to establish PSCD can 
be taken by qualified majority voting as opposed to unanimity voting, making the mechanism 
easier to establish, at least on paper.  
 
PSCD is meant to add to what already exists through the establishment of a high level of 
criteria thus ensuring that capability development is structured.
19
 Indeed for the first time 
within the area of CSDP, a binding leverage will be introduced, meaning that PSCD 
constitutes a very rare opportunity.
20
 This is because participating Member States would have 
to meet a number of objectives aimed at the improvement of military capabilities or would 
have to leave PSCD. Thus the potential for meaningful capability development through PSCD 
is very real. It would add value through increasing cost effectiveness, multinational 
cooperation, assessment, increased sustainability and finally inclusiveness and flexibility in 
reaching the criteria.
21
 Thus PSCD should encourage the Member States to move from 
defence sovereignty towards pooled defence resources. Indeed for all Member States, apart 
from France and the UK, PSCD makes sense due to the pooling element although it should be 
stated that not all small and medium Member States are in favour.
22
 This is particularly the 
case in the context of the current financial crisis where defence budgets are under pressure. 
Therefore PSCD acts as a way of acquiring essential capabilities at less cost. It could even be 
considered that all PSCD needs to be a success is to save money.
23
 Indeed this is the major 
attraction of PSCD. A report on PSCD by the West European Union also underlines this by 
emphasising that PSCD must be attractive which can be done by ‘offering a sufficient return 
on investment to provide an incentive for the non-participating states to join it’.24 
 
To discuss PSCD, a seminar took place under the Spanish Presidency in mid March 2010 in 
Brussels. Whilst the Spanish have placed PSCD on the agenda, they have at the same time not 
taken the lead and instead were very careful regarding pushing the idea.
25
 Indeed there did not 
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appear to be a champion for PSCD, be it a Member State or a group of Member States, 
capable of placing the issue on the agenda of the European Council, although there was the 
suggestion that the Weimar group could fulfil this role.
26
  Indeed there have been some 
preliminary reflections within the Weimar group regarding some initial basic ideas for 
PSCD.
27
 Under the Belgium Presidency in the second half of 2010, an assertive position on 
the issue has been taken, including a position paper by the next three holders of the 
Presidency – Belgium, Hungary and Poland as well as a seminar which took place on 13 July 
2010. This was attended by 120 national experts.
28
 Nonetheless, without one or more of the 
big Member State to get fully behind the initiative and give it some momentum, there is only 
so much the Belgians and Spaniards can do to push PSCD forward.
29
 Indeed the outcome of 
the Belgian Presidency was the Ghent initiative which made no mention of PSCD and instead 
focused on ‘Pooling and Sharing’. 
 
2.1. Criteria for PSCD 
A number of issues still remain to be resolved before PSCD can be initiated. These essentially 
revolve around the criteria which should be put in place when establishing PSCD. First, will 
there be one PSCD or several relating to different capabilities? In essence, the idea is to have 
one PSCD and within that there will be clusters of Member States. Each participating state 
will be able to decide on the types of projects it wants to take part in and how to cooperate, 
but all states will abide by a common set of criteria.
30
 It is important to note, that PSCD 
should be as inclusive as possible. In this respect, the more participating Member States, the 
more synergies and effects of scale which can be created.
31
 Additionally to make PSCD 
selective would create a two tier EU in defence. Hence, there would be no incentive for those 
in the second league to increase their military capabilities.
32
 Thus as Herz states, ‘it is 
important to find a middle ground between too loose criteria for membership to the PSCoop 
[PSCD] which would defeat its point of faster integration, and too constricting criteria which 
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would reduce the number of Member States involved’.33 Indeed it is this concern over 
exclusion which has led to some Member States’ negative opinion of PSCD. 
 
To alleviate this problem, criteria should be fulfilled by a specific date rather than be a 
condition of initial entry. Biscop and Coelmont have suggested that participating Member 
States (pMS) should increase their deployability and sustainability by an agreed % and by an 
agreed deadline.
34
 They should also try to harmonize their defence expenditures, contribute in 
ratio of their GDP to EDA-initiative projects and contribute to all CSDP operations requiring 
military assets. Nonetheless, is it realistic to demand that participating Member States have to 
put up capabilities for every operation? This in particular relates back to divergences between 
the EU Member States’ strategic cultures concerning a regional vs. global approach to 
security and defence and pro-active on the use of force vs. restrictions concerning the use of 
force. In other words, for political reasons, Member States do not necessarily want to 
contribute to every military operation. Therefore, whilst Member States can be encouraged to 
participate in military operations using equipment developed through PSCD, they would 
reject any strongly binding commitment in this direction.
35
 This implies that participating 
Member States would reject criteria which forced them to contribute to every EU military 
operation.  
 
Nonetheless, as the Belgian, Hungarian and Polish position paper points out PSCD ‘should 
form a Top-Down approach, aim at improving the required defence capabilities – including 
armament and R & T – that are needed for conducted the most demanding operations. In other 
words, the structured cooperation should be considered as a process ultimately leading to 
convergence’.36 In this respect PSCD is seen as a process which will lead to convergence and 
thus to a stronger European strategic culture. However the report by the Belgian Presidency 
on the seminar which occurred was less enthusiastic about this aspect. It highlighted that 
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PSCD will not fix ‘the absence of consensus regarding a common strategic view on 
CFSP/CSDP’37 and instead recommended producing a European Grand Strategy or White 
Book. Thus the question remains as to whether PSCD will be an adequate vehicle to create 
processes of convergence. Indeed greater convergence needs to materialise before a White 
Book could be created. In this respect the replacement of PSCD with ‘Pooling and Sharing’ 
appears to represent a downgrading of what Member States are willing to do. Nonetheless, the 
Ghent Initiative has produced some momentum in enabling the Member States to find 
additional areas in which to initiate pooling and sharing initiatives without it being seen to be 
an exclusive club meaning that it is more open and usable.
38
 Therefore “pooling and sharing” 
could represent a vehicle with which PSCD can eventually be operationalised. 
 
 2.2. The Implementation of the EU Battlegroup Concept: A Warning for PSCD? 
How successful is PSCD likely to be and will it facilitate the top down approach which is 
currently missing from CSDP? One way of assessing this and to highlight its pitfalls is 
through the EU Battlegroup Concept which can be seen as a de-facto or operational form of 
PSCD.
39
 A Battlegroup comprises 1500 armed force personnel and can be formed either 
unilaterally or multinationally.
40
 Evidently it is the multinational aspect which makes the 
Battlegroups a form of PSCD as a group of EU Member States (in addition to third countries) 
can come together to form a Battlegroup i.e. a type of rapid reaction capability. For all 
Member States, apart from France, Italy and the UK, coming together to create a Battlegroup 
is the only feasible way of contributing to the concept, highlighting that only through pooling 
can Member States participate. Moreover, there is just one concept, with one set of criteria 
and within that, a number of different groupings or clusters, which is exactly how PSCD is 
envisaged. Additionally there is also an element of flexibility in the Battlegroup Concept as it 
is up to the participating Member States concerning exactly how a Battlegroup is formed. 
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This includes the type of assets that each Member State provides, which again ties in with 
PSCD.  
 
On paper, the Member States are committed to the Battlegroup Concept, as evidenced by the 
fact that 25 out of 27 Member States plus four non-EU countries are participating. However, 
the fact remains that the Battlegroups have yet to be deployed despite discussions on three 
occasions regarding their potential usage. There are primarily two reasons for the 
Battlegroups lack of deployment which interconnect with PSCD. First is that the Battlegroups 
are simply too small and are therefore unable to fill mission remits, including the size and 
scope of operations as occurred for Congo in 2006 and Chad in 2008.
41
 Whilst PSCD is there 
to create capabilities which then feeds into a mission, it does highlight the problem regarding 
the connection between creating capabilities and their usefulness. Thus PSCD will not add 
any value if it is not in line with the capabilities that are needed.
42
  
 
The second area concerns political willingness and in particular relates to the divergences 
between the Member States concerning a regional vs. a global approach to security and 
defence which can be influenced by their views on when force should be used (i.e. pro-active 
on the use of force vs. restrictions concerning the use of force). In this respect, some countries 
such as Germany have restrictions on the use of force and do not have immediate defence 
interests in Africa for example. Meanwhile others such as the UK and France have a global 
approach to security, exemplified by their willingness to engage militarily in a number of 
theatres outside of the European continent. Due to the fact that the Battlegroups rotate every 
six months, whether a mission using the Battlegroups would go ahead depends on whether it 
is in a participating Member State’s interest to deploy. Interestingly, Germany has rejected the 
use of the Battlegroups in the Congo in 2006 and in 2008. Indeed there is concern among 
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German policy-makers that France is using CSDP to upload its post-colonial responsibilities 
to the EU level.
43
  
 
This issue also has the potential to affect PSCD. After creating the capabilities, will the 
Member States actually deploy them? Whilst it might appear that this issue has the ability to 
affect the Battlegroups more than PSCD due to the former’s rotational nature, the same might 
also occur in PSCD if Member States decide to specialise or if a group of likeminded states 
come together to create the same capability. This is due to the fact that one country could 
block the use of a particular capability.
44
 Nonetheless, Biscop states that ‘the more integrated 
Europe’s military capabilities will be, the more EU Member States will be pushed to act as 
one’.45 From this perspective, inclusivity is key to preventing PSCD from suffering the same 
problems as the Battlegroups. This is particularly so in the context of a lack of any strategic 
defence document detailing where the EU’s interests actually lie. However without any 
binding commitment regarding equipment on the ground in operations, it is difficult to see 
how this will overcome political willingness problems in the context of PSCD.  
 
Although it might appear that the Battlegroups have failed in their current form, the concept 
has succeeded in generating additional capabilities in some Member States as highlighted by 
Jacoby and Jones
46
 in the case of Sweden. Indeed whilst joining both the Battlegroups and 
PSCD is voluntary, peer pressure ensures participation. As Biscop states in relation to PSCD 
‘the desire to “be in” will probably lead many others to participate. Once in, peer pressure and 
to avoid exclusion for no longer fulfilling the criteria should stimulate Member States’ 
efforts’.47 Indeed participating Member States could use PSCD to fill capability gaps in their 
Battlegroups and in achieving the criteria for PSCD, some Member States could use a 
Battlegroup. However, it should be underlined that the two are not automatically connected 
and that the Battlegroups should be seen as one potential way of achieving PSCD targets.
48
.To 
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sum up, the Battlegroups act as a warning for PSCD. If PSCD is not to be yet another missed 
opportunity in the story of European security and defence and if it is to fulfil its potential, then 
the Member States must ensure that only capabilities which are required and usable are 
created. This needs to be built on a top down approach to security, encompassing when and 
where Member States should use force in an EU context.  
 
3. The EDA: a champion for PSCD? 
 3.1. Governance and project areas  
The European Defence Agency was established in July 2004 with a Council Joint Action 
2004/551/CFSP of the Council of Ministers with the idea of providing for better coordination 
and harmonisation of defence cooperation among the Member States in the framework of the 
CSDP. Building on previous (unsuccessful) ideas for the creation of such a body
49
 and 
prompted by an array of economic and identity-related factors,
50
 the creation of the EDA 
became a reality after key Member States’ preferences converged on the EU level.51  After 
years of opposing the creation of an EU based Agency in the field of armaments, defence 
procurement and cooperation, Britain agreed with the French proposals for setting up such a 
body.
52
 Paris suggested that the new body will not be a traditional national armaments agency 
focused exclusively on defence procurement, but rather a ‘capabilities agency’, bringing 
together research, development, and procurement and providing the political framework for 
common European armament projects. Thus, it would also have an important political role - 
to direct and evaluate Member States’ progress towards fulfilling their capability 
commitments.
53
 The deal between the UK and France was signed at their bilateral summit in 
Le Touquet, in February 2003. The initiative was then agreed at the EU level, with the 
European Council at Thessaloniki supporting it in December 2003 and the Council of 
Ministers formally establishing the European Defence Agency with a Joint Action in July 
2004.  
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The Agency has been operational ever since, but only two years ago the Treaty of Lisbon 
codified it, thus giving it an explicit legal personality. Under Art. 28d (1 & 2), the EDA has a 
number of tasks: to identify and evaluate common military capability objectives; to promote 
the harmonisation of operational needs and the adoption of procurement methods; to propose 
multilateral projects and ensure the coordination of the respective programmes; to support and 
coordinate EU level defence research and development activities; to improve the effectiveness 
of military expenditure within the EU; and identify measures for strengthening the industrial 
and technological base of the defence sector.  
 
The Agency currently has 26 participating Member States.
54
 It carries out its tasks in liaison 
with the Commission and its statute, seat and operational rules are determined by a Council 
decision based on a QMV procedure.
55
 Thus, it introduces a number of supranational 
elements in the defence field. These include the establishment of a common pool of 
information, the development of common standards that promote greater harmonization and 
“more coherence and integration in defence cooperation among EU Member States”.56 
However the EDA fundamentally remains an intergovernmental body. Having limited 
mandate and power from the Member States, geared mostly towards producing and providing 
information to them and being governed by ministers or governmental appointees, the EDA 
clearly exhibits characteristics of a classic inter-governmental agency.
57
 It is headed by the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) – currently 
Baroness Catherine Ashton - who is responsible for its overall functioning. She also ensures 
that the strategic direction provided by the EU Council and the decisions of the EDA’s 
Steering Board are correctly implemented by the Chief Executive. The Steering Board is 
chaired by the HR, consists of the EU Defence Ministers (or their representatives) and 
operates within the political framework provided by the Council of Ministers. Among other 
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things, it adopts the Agency’s general budget, appoints the Chief Executive (on a proposal 
from the Head of the Agency); adopts the EDA rules of procedure and takes decisions by 
QMV. Its personnel consists of national experts seconded by the Member States, staff 
recruited directly by the Agency under fixed-term contracts and a small number of 
Community officials.
58
   
 
Between its creation and the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Agency has been 
active in establishing an armaments strategy, research and development strategy and industrial 
strategy.
59
 In 2005 most of the EDA participating Member States
60
 agreed on a Code of 
Conduct for Defence Procurement as a means towards the creation of an internationally 
competitive European Defence Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defence 
Technological and Industrial base. The main principles of the Code are: a voluntary, non-
binding approach; fair and equal treatment of suppliers; mutual transparency and 
accountability; mutual support; and mutual benefit.
61
 In October 2006 the Agency produced 
the ‘Long-Term Vision’ report, which was endorsed by European Union Defence Ministers at 
a meeting of the EDA Steering Board in Levi, Finland. This was the product of 11 months of 
study involving officials and experts from governments, defence bodies, academia and 
industry across Europe.
62
 Although it was a non-committing document it was important in 
that it provided directions for defence planners in all Member States on the military 
capabilities that will be required in the framework of the CSDP, related to the global security 
challenges facing Europe in the next 20 years.
63
  
 
Based on this document, in 2007 the EDA’s Capabilities Directorate identified several key 
areas for capability improvement and started working on a Capability Development Plan.
64
 
Some of these areas include the development of ‘Software Defined Radio’ to improve 
interoperability across Member States, a ‘Network Enabled Capability’ to enhance the 
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effectiveness of CSDP operations through a common communications and information 
network and Maritime Surveillance Network capabilities for the identification of small, highly 
mobile and threatening forces in open waters. Meanwhile, work in the area of ‘Chemical, 
Biological and Nuclear Hazards’ has encompassed toxic industrial materials in building 
capabilities for their detection, identification and monitoring. Finally two important areas 
have been identified by the Member States as critical to CSDP operations. The ‘European Air 
Transport Fleet’ aims to pool national airlift resources to enhance the EU’s strategic air-lift 
capability, whilst the Future Transport Helicopter initiative and a helicopter training 
programme, will increase in-theatre mobility and build up capabilities for flying in demanding 
operational and environmental scenarios.
65
 In the context of these key areas the EDA 
currently provides the politico-strategic framework for the implementation of over 50 
projects. Some of these are worth 50 million, others over 100 million euro. All projects are 
implemented by different constellations of members - from 4-5 to 20 participating states - and 
each works towards building respective sets of capabilities in the above identified key areas.
66
  
 
The latest development involving the EDA as the venue for political dialogue happened 
namely in the context of the above mentioned Ghent Initiative. On 30 November 2011 the EU 
defence ministers met in the framework of the EDA’s Steering Board to endorse a package of 
eleven areas for cooperation under the logo of ‘Pooling and Sharing’, ranging from ‘medical 
field hospitals’ and ‘air-to-air refuelling’ to ‘smart munitions’ and ‘naval logistics’ with the 
first projects starting already in December 2011.
67
 Indeed, the Polish Presidency has been 
pushing the development of CSDP including ‘Pooling and Sharing’.  
 
3.2. The EDA’s role in the operationalisation of the PSCD 
In relation to PSCD, the EDA does not have any decision making power for its actual 
operationalisation (this stays firmly within the PSC and the Council) but rather may have an 
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expert say in its practical set up and further development. The EDA possesses an enormous 
database of all the projects and programmes of its participating Member States and could 
therefore provide the relevant information for setting up the criteria for PSCD. Based on that 
information, the EDA can also be useful for the actual implementation of the concept. In 
addition, the EDA is supposed to give a regular assessment of the PSCD participating 
Member States’ contributions with regards to identified capability needs for the 
operationalisation of PSCD.
68
 Also, thanks to its expert know-how it can provide regular 
evaluation of its practical implementation. In particular, it can be useful in identifying 
shortfalls in capability standards and suggesting ways to tackle them.
69
  
 
Another important function of the EDA in the operationalisation of PSCD is that it may 
provide a useful forum for political dialogue. It is realistic to assume that initially not all EDA 
Member States will become participants in PSCD but still the EDA may provide a framework 
for transparent dialogue between both the participating and non-participating states. Some 
consider that this may lead to greater socialisation in the domain of joint capability 
development and thus alleviate some of the existing divisions and suspicions among the 
Member States.
70
 Moreover, this may also provide for greater accountability in PSCD 
matters. In this respect PSCD may in fact help in raising the profile of the EDA by making it 
more engaged and politically visible. Related to the latter, the very fact that the High 
Representative is also the chair of the EDA helps in raising its political visibility.
71
 In 
particular it may contribute towards the faster implementation of some of the most demanding 
projects, by generating the needed political and financial resources for this to happen. The 
EDA also has a strong potential to boost the civil-military interface in crisis management 
operations because the projects that are currently running - e.g. maritime surveillance, 
software defined radio, transport helicopter training - have value and potential usefulness for 
both the military and civilian domains.
72
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Finally, the financial aspects of a possible further integration in the defence field in the 
context of the PSCD are crucial insofar as this type of cooperation is seen as offering much 
better output for the input that the Member States would commit. This would mean mostly 
better deployable and better deployed forces and capabilities, including terminating redundant 
forces rather than wasting money in maintaining identical national capabilities.
73
 For its part, 
the EDA can encourage higher savings among the Member States through promoting joint 
projects on EU level and hence greater pooling of resources. Without a completely new 
mechanism for encouraging savings in defence matters further integration in this field in the 
EU would inevitably become harder. In this respect the Defence Ministers meeting in 
Brussels on 30 November which endorsed the start of eleven cooperative projects is a point of 
attention. The importance of this meeting is that it happened in the midst of the worst 
financial crisis experienced by the EU Member States since the introduction of the ‘Euro‘  
and as such, it underlined the need for cooperation and savings of scale by means of pooling 
and sharing in the defence field. During the meeting, the EDA’s current Chief Executive Ms. 
Claude-France Arnould was explicit in this respect, appealing for a “top-down direction to put 
in place a cooperative way of working” and endorsing Pooling and Sharing as “part of the 
solution” of the Member States’ current budgetary challenges.74  
 
All in all, the EDA can be seen as a facilitator that prompts the Member States to cooperate 
and participate in joint projects, and hence it can play an important role in operationalising 
PSCD.
75
 However, the main question regards whether the EDA manages to capitalise on its 
potential to contribute to the PSCD project – having in mind the existence of a number of 
issues regarding Member States’ motivation to fully work through the EDA. 
 
4.  Key problem areas 
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Similarly to the difficulties in operationalising the Battlegroup Concept, some of the main 
problems facing the EDA relate to the issue of political will. In particular they point to two of 
the earlier identified divisions among the Member States: defence sovereignty vs. pooled 
defence resources; and Europeanist vs. Atlanticist approaches to security and defence. The 
other two divisions - regional vs. global approach; and pro-active on the use of force vs. 
restrictions concerning the use of force - are also relevant, as they set the parameters within 
which the EDA and PSCD have to work. However, since this has been covered in section 
2.2., the following sections build on this foundation by outlining the practical problems that 
occur in fully utilising the potential of the EDA which the first two divisions create.    
 
Some consider that initially the EDA was more active and entrepreneurial, “more at the front” 
and hence more visible than today.
76
 Among the main reasons are the lack of a strong 
leadership and the gradual change in thinking among the EDA’s staff - from the first 
generation which was more enthusiastic in starting the new project, to the current one which 
has a much more pragmatic attitude.
77
 However, the more acute problems facing the EDA are 
related to the following divisions among the EU Member States.  
 
4.1. Going European or remaining national? 
Firstly not all Member States see the added value in doing business through the EDA - i.e. by 
joining trans-national projects within its framework. As it is already known, one of the EDA’s 
main goals is to support the creation of an internal EU defence market and integrated 
European defence industry, hence the principle of pooled defence resources.
78
 In 2006 the 
EDA adopted two important documents that provide the legal framework for such 
developments to occur – the ‘Framework Agreement of Security of Supply’ and ‘Security of 
Information’. Both of these documents provide the necessary guarantees for the subscribing 
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Member States that their defence needs will be fully met in the context of such an 
unprecedented intra-European pooling of resources.  
 
However, seven years after the establishment of the EDA, the Member States have not moved 
too far in utilising its resources and prefer to continue with their national programmes which 
overlap in most cases. Reportedly, the national focus is predominant with ‘20 plus’ national 
programmes existing in the field of procurement, research and the development of 
armaments.
79
 Another example is given by Keohane and Valasek
80
 who report that in 2008 
alone, there were 16 national programmes for the development of armoured vehicles run 
within the EU without any form of cooperation and coordination among the Member States. 
As the situation currently remains the same, this clearly exemplifies the logic of ‘defence 
sovereignty’, which is still present in the EU Member States.81 Although this creates serious 
duplication of efforts and financial resources, the Member States have not yet reached 
political consensus on relinquishing some and specialising in other capabilities, thus pooling 
resources more efficiently. This problem highlights the division of defence sovereignty vs. 
pooled defence resources and constitutes one of the most serious problems facing the work of 
the EDA and potentially the operationalisation of the PSCD concept. It is plausible to expect 
that some Member States may not wish to give up their defence sovereignty for pooling 
defence resources in the framework of PSCD. If this creates a situation in which a number of 
Member States permanently opt out from PSCD, this would certainly render the whole 
concept unsuccessful. 
 
 4.2. Buying American or choosing European? 
Another acute problem facing the work of the EDA and again leading to weak political 
backing from the Member States is the division over the issue of Atlanticism vs. Europeanism 
regarding pooling armaments production, procurement, joint capabilities projects as well as 
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the creation of a European defence industrial base. Political differences between Member 
States are specifically visible in the field of defence equipment acquisitions where the 
dilemma is to buy established American brands or available European alternatives.
82
 Batora 
observes that Denmark and the Netherlands already expressed interest in buying the US-
produced Joint Strike Fighter instead of alternatives such as the Eurofighter (German–Italian–
Spanish–British cooperation), Rafale (French) or Gripen (Swedish–British).83 Similarly, 
Kirchner and Sperling highlighted the traditionally strong UK interest in keeping their special 
relationship with the US intact. In their estimation, this together with “the ambition harboured 
by British military contractors to acquire the coveted status of prime contractor to the US 
Defense Department place additional limitations on the ability and willingness of the UK to 
deepen the integration of the European defence industrial base”.84  
 
Poland, meanwhile was accused of ‘buying American’ when Polish policy-makers decided to 
buy 48 F-16s in 2003, which incorporated a $3.8 billion loan from the US, instead of 
investing in the European-made alternatives. As Longhurst and Zaborowski state, ‘Poland’s 
choice in defence procurement of US rather than European systems is a firm expression of 
Warsaw’s Atlanticist credentials’.85 Others are openly pragmatic, expressing the view that if 
NATO offers established and working standards in communication or equipment systems it 
would not be practical to create new standards and buy new systems.
86
 It should however be 
noted that the Poles are firm advocates of the EDA and have signed up to the EDA’s code of 
conduct in addition to pledging ten million euros to the EDA’s Defence R&T Joint 
Investment Programme on Force Protection. Also they have recently purchased 23 helicopters 
from the ‘Eurocopter’ division of the European Aeronautics and Defence Company (EADS)87 
and fully participate in the EDA’s helicopter training programme.88 The question however is 
how far Atlanticist EU Member States such as the UK can begin to buy and sell European. 
The existence of hesitation and unwillingness on this issue demonstrates that even in the 
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context of some level of institutionalisation of common structures (EDA) and standards (Code 
of Conduct on Defence Procurement) there is still an insufficient level of convergence of 
values and norms among the Member States regarding defence procurement. 
 
Overall, the EDA can potentially have an actual added value to the PSCD concept but only 
when the Member States start pooling respective resources in more areas and find ways to 
balance the Europeanist and the Atlanticist approaches in this respect. Moreover, the EDA 
can be useful in the operationalisation of PSCD only if the latter is in line with the capabilities 
that are needed. If PSCD is driven by industry interests rather than the already identified 
priorities, the EDA would be able to add much less value to both the PSCD and the further 
development of the Common Security and Defence Policy. In the context of the weak 
convergence of values and norms among the Member States and aligning with a common 
European interest in defence procurement, and armaments production it seems that it is 
premature to talk about  a sufficiently developed European strategic culture in this domain. 
This weakens both the potential of the Member States to operationalise PSCD and the ability 
of the EDA to act as a promoter of the new concept.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This article has highlighted the missing defence component - or the ‘D’ - in CSDP by 
analysing the lack of progress on military capability development thus far. It applied the 
concept of strategic culture including four closely related conflicting visions among the EU 
Member States concerning European security and defence. Within this, it has highlighted the 
work of the EDA and the extent to which PSCD can alleviate these problems. In so doing, it 
has underlined the problems of defence procurement and has used the Battlegroups to 
highlight the potential pitfalls of PSCD.  
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The four conflicting visions were focused on: Atlanticism vs. Europeanist approaches, a 
regional vs. global approach to security and defence, pro-active on the use of force vs. 
restrictions concerning the use of force and defence sovereignty vs. pooled defence resources. 
Member States’ geographical approach to defence and their approach to using force, impacts 
on political willingness. This connects to whether Member States are willing to deploy the 
capabilities they have invested in, as well as which military procurement projects they will 
participate in. Relating to this, the Battlegroup Concept highlighted that whilst Member States 
were committed to the concept on paper, deploying them was an issue for countries such as 
Germany which has restrictions on the use force and a more regional approach to defence. In 
this respect, PSCD provides an opportunity for military capability development but does not 
avoid the obstacle of Member States failing to deploy the capabilities that have been created 
due to a lack of defence interests.  
 
The other two divisions directly impact the work of the EDA in actually acquiring the 
necessary military capabilities. A predominant number of Member States prefer to invest in 
national programmes in the field of procurement, research and development of armaments. 
Some Member States have consistently taken their relations with the US into account when 
deciding on which military capability to purchase. Others have demonstrated an explicitly 
pragmatic approach when deciding on particular defence equipment acquisition plans. This 
hardly bodes well for a concept such as PSCD which is based on pooling and thus implies a 
move from defence sovereignty to pooled defence resources. PSCD requires as many Member 
States as possible to be involved in order to get the economies of scale and interoperability 
which are required. The question remains as to whether PSCD will end up as a lowest 
common denominator concept, where the criteria are set by the least willing participating 
Member State rather than by the information provided by the EDA. This is particularly 
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important as this information is based above all on the capabilities which are needed and are 
thus useful rather than political criteria.  
 
By examining four areas of conflicting views of European security, this article has highlighted 
that a European strategic culture is not advanced enough to provide a top down approach to 
military capability development. Instead a bottom up approach would most likely remain in 
the foreseeable future whereby action is based on what capabilities are available within each 
Member State rather than being shaped by what role the EU should be playing. Nonetheless, 
will PSCD enable the Member States to go beyond this? By acting in union and pooling 
resources, participating Member States will be forced to look at when and where these 
capabilities should be used. Indeed, this is a necessity to ensure that PSCD does not become 
another ‘missed opportunity’ in the story of the development of CSDP. However, in the 
context of an insufficiently developed EU strategic culture in defence and the lack of active 
leadership for promoting PSCD it seems that the concept might not be operationalised any 
time soon, underlined by the move to ‘Pooling and Sharing’ which has seemingly replaced 
PSCD. In this respect, while the EDA may continue its work successfully in that military 
capabilities will be developed, the ‘D’ will still be missing.
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